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ABSTRACT 
A panel of industrial countries is examined for evidence of `tax smoothing’. Tax 
smoothing results when governments minimize tax distortions over time. The model 
provides a positive theory of government debt and is due primarily to Barro. Unit 
root tests are performed in panel data to test the null hypothesis of nonstationary tax 
rates. Panel regressions are then undertaken to test the null hypothesis that tax rate 
changes are unpredictable and test for evidence of an alternative hypothesis. Political 
and economic variables are examined for their ability to predict tax rate changes. 
Overall, the results cannot reject the null hypotheses and support tax smoothing by 
national governments. 
  
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The goal of this paper is to contribute towards understanding 
the behaviour of government debt. Tax smoothing 
results when governments `smooth’ tax rates to minimize 
the costs of taxation over time. If the marginal costs of 
taxation are an increasing function of the amount of 
resources taxed, given a long-run balanced budget constraint, 
then minimization of the total costs of taxation 
implies that the planned tax rate will be constant over 
time. Changes in the tax rate will be unpredictable and 
the tax rate will behave as a random walk. Temporary 
deviations in government spending and output from their 
permanent levels will result in a deficit or surplus, but no 
change in the tax rate. The model provides a positive 
theory of government debt and is due primarily to Barro 
(1979). 
 
This study examines two implications of the tax smoothing 
model. First, the random walk implication predicts that 
the tax rate will be a nonstationary time series with a unit 
root. Second, tax smoothing implies that tax rate changes 
will be unpredictable. Therefore, lagged information 
should not be useful in predicting tax rate changes. These 
implications are examined by testing the null hypotheses 
that the tax rate has a unit root and that tax rate changes 
are orthogonal to lagged information. To address some 
recent criticisms that political factors might prevent tax 
smoothing, political variables are included in the lagged 
information set. Significant lagged information could also 
provide evidence of an alternative hypothesis. Testing is 
undertaken in panels created by pooling time series 
from 19 industrial countries. The use of panel data signifi- 
cantly increases the power of the tests to reject their null 
hypotheses. Annual central government data is examined 
for the period 1955±1988. Overall, the results cannot reject 
the null hypotheses and support tax smoothing by national 
governments. 
 
Section II discusses the theory of tax smoothing and 
reviews some of the literature. Section III describes the 
model. Section IV discusses the data. Section V presents 
the empirical results. Section VI summarizes and 
concludes. 
 
 
II. BACKGROUND 
 
Tax smoothing implies that governments set tax rates so as 
to minimize the cost of intertemporal tax distortions. Given 
the information available today, the tax rate would be considered 
as permanent and would be changed only with new 
information about future government spending and output. 
No prediction could be made of tax rate changes 
and the tax rate would behave as a random walk. 
Empirical testing of the tax smoothing theory has 
focused on single country tests. See, for example, Barro 
(1981, 1986), Sahasakul (1986), Kochin et al. (1986), 
Trehan and Walsh (1988), Bizer and Durlauf (1990, 
1991), Gupta (1992), Huang and Lin (1993) and 
Strazicich (1997). Results of these tests have been mixed. 
Barro, Kochin et al., Huang and Lin, and Strazicich find 
general support for tax smoothing when examining US 
federal tax rates. Gupta finds evidence of tax smoothing 
when examining Canadian federal tax rates. Contrary to 
this, Sahasakul and Bizer and Durlauf reject tax smoothing 
when examining US federal tax rates. Trehan and Walsh 
reject tax smoothing when examining US federal tax revenues. 
These tests examine either the time series properties 
of the data or test regression models derived from tax 
smoothing. 
 
One exception to performing single country tests is 
Roubini and Sachs (1989). Using a reduced form model 
of the deficit derived from tax smoothing; Roubini and 
Sachs test a panel of 14 OECD countries for evidence of 
tax smoothing. General government deficits are regressed 
on a number of variables suggested by tax smoothing. They 
include a measure of political influence that, if significant, 
may be unfavourable to tax smoothing. Roubini and Sachs 
find budget deficits to be significantly affected by political 
factors, especially since 1975, and reject tax smoothing. 
They suggest that political factors, in particular the cohesion 
of national governments, significantly affect the budget 
making process to the detriment of tax smoothing. For 
example, a weakly cohesive government might ignore such 
forward looking costs as intertemporal tax distortions. In 
separate single country tests they regress the first differenced 
tax rate on a constant term. They reject tax smoothing 
after finding a significant constant term, or `drift’, for 
most countries. 
 
A number of issues can be raised regarding the testing 
methodology employed by Roubini and Sachs. One potential 
problem with their methodology is its reliance on correctly 
specifying a particular reduced-form model. If the 
model tested is not correctly specified, then biased estimates 
may result. The authors describe a model where 
the budget deficit is a function of last year’s deficit, the 
change in unemployment, the change in output growth, 
the change in the rate of real interest minus the rate of 
growth of output multiplied by the lagged debt-to-GDP 
ratio, and a political cohesion variable. Tax smoothing 
hypothesizes that temporary changes in government spending 
will be financed by changes in the government’s budget 
balance but with no change in the tax rate. Roubini and 
Sachs use changes in unemployment and GDP growth to 
account for temporary changes in the ratio of government 
spending to GDP. While correct in principle, a more direct 
measure of temporary government spending to output is 
not included. As such, their results may be sensitive to their 
measure of temporary government spending to output. 
Bias regression coeficients will result if changes in unemployment 
and GDP growth do not accurately measure the 
ratio of temporary government spending to output. The 
model tested by Sahasakul is subject to this same potential 
criticism. Contrary to this, the methodology employed in 
this paper does not depend on accurately specifying a particular 
reduced-form model. 
 
A second potential problem with the approach in 
Roubini and Sachs relates to their use of general government 
data. Benjamin and Kochin (1978, 1982) suggest that 
resource mobility may constrain state and local governments 
from smoothing tax rates. As deficits and surpluses 
occur, mobile resources would be encouraged to seek out 
taxable jurisdictions where current government spending 
exceeds current taxes and vice versa. Therefore, the ability 
of state and local governments to smooth tax rates would 
be diminished. Resource mobility predicts that state and 
local governments will balance budgets and not smooth tax 
rates. Strazicich (1996, 1997) presents evidence from the 
USA and Canada in support of this argument. Thus, inclusion 
of revenue from all levels of government in the tax rate 
measure tested by Roubini and Sachs could bias results in 
favour of rejecting tax smoothing. 
 
The final issue deals with the assumption by Roubini and 
Sachs that a drift in tax rates rejects tax smoothing. If the 
marginal cost function of the tax rate was decreasing over 
time, tax smoothing would predict an upward drift in the 
tax rate. Therefore, finding a significant drift in tax rates is 
not sufficient to reject tax smoothing. 1 
 
 
III . THE MODEL 
 
The tax smoothing model, in panel data, assumes a government 
budget identity for country i at period t as follows: 
 
 (1) 
where Git is real total government expenditures excluding 
interest on the national debt, Bit is the real stock of 
national debt outstanding at the end of period t, Tit is 
real tax revenue, and rit is the real rate of interest. Dividing 
terms in Equation 1 by Yit (real output of country i), an 
intertemporal budget constraint can be expressed as 
follows: 
 
 
According to Equation 3, only the ratio of permanent 
government spending to output and the ratio of previously 
outstanding debt to output determine the tax rate at time t. 
For example, a temporary increase in git would be primarily 
financed by debt, since any increase in git would 
be less than the current increase in git. The tax rate 
would rise by less than the current increase in git, implying 
a `smoothing’ of tax rates over time. Thus, tax smoothing 
provides a theory of government debt: deficits arise when 
government spending is temporarily high or when output is 
temporarily low. 
 
 
 
IV. DATA 
 
Panel data on the average tax rate series (½it) will be examined 
for the period 1955±1988.2 The average tax rate for 
each of 19 countries is calculated as annual central government 
revenue divided by annual Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP). The countries examined are the USA, Canada, 
Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, 
and the UK. Data comes from various editions of the 
International Financial Statistics Yearbook published by 
the International Monetary Fund.3 
 
Tests for significant lagged information employ four 
lagged values each of the tax rate, the ratio of government 
expenditures to output, the growth of real GDP and a 
measure of the national government’s political cohesion 
or unity denoted as polit. An additional term representing 
polit since 1975 is also examined and is denoted as poldit.4 
As in Roubini and Sachs, poldit is used to test the null 
hypothesis that political cohesiveness of national governments 
gained importance in the budget making process 
after 1974. Annual data on government expenditure and 
real GDP is available since 1960 and comes from various 
editions of the International Financial Statistics Yearbook. 
The political cohesion measure is taken from Roubini and 
Sachs and is available for 14 countries over the period 
1960±1985.5 The measure is a number from zero to three, 
determined by factors such as whether a parliamentary 
government has a majority or a presidential government 
has diff erent political parties controlling the executive 
and legislative branches. A value of zero indicates the 
most cohesive government and a value of three the least 
cohesive. See the Data Appendix for additional discussion 
of the data. 
 
 
V. EMPIRICAL TESTS 
 
Unit root tests 
 
 
 
Therefore, under the null hypothesis of a unit root tax 
smoothing is supported in all countries, while under the 
alternative hypothesis tax smoothing is rejected in one or 
more countries. Single equation unit root test results are 
reported in Table 1. The single equation tests reject the unit 
root null hypothesis only in one country (Finland) at the 
5% level of significance. To determine if inability to reject 
the unit root null in more than one country is due to low 
power, the panel unit root test is undertaken using all countries 
except Finland. The results are reported in Table 2. 
The IPS panel test statistic of ¡0:827 cannot reject the unit 
root null at any of the usual significance levels. Overall, the 
findings in Table 1 and 2 support tax smoothing by 
national governments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regression tests of lagged information 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VI . CONCLUSIONS 
 
National government tax rates were examined in 19 industrial 
countries for evidence of tax smoothing. If governments 
set tax rates to minimize distortions over time, the 
tax rate will be a nonstationary time series with a unit root 
and tax rate changes will be unpredictable. The null 
hypothesis was first examined by testing for a unit root 
in each country. The null of tax smoothing was rejected 
in only one country (i.e. Finland). To increase power, testing 
was undertaken in panel data utilizing time series from 
all countries except Finland. In spite of greater power, the 
panel test results could not reject the null hypothesis of a 
unit root in national tax rates. Panel regression tests were 
then undertaken to examine the null hypothesis that tax 
rate changes are unpredictable from past information and 
look for evidence of an alternative hypothesis. Results were 
unable to reject the null hypothesis that tax rate changes 
are unpredictable. Political variables were not significant in 
any case. Overall, the empirical findings presented in this 
paper provide support for tax smoothing as a theory of 
national government debt. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Revenue of the Central Government, Expenditures of the 
Central Government, Gross Domestic Product, and Real 
Gross Domestic Product: International Financial Statistics 
Yearbook, International Monetary Fund, Washington, 
DC. 1955±59, 1981 edition; 1960±62, 1990 edition; 1963± 
1988, 1993 edition. Political cohesion estimates come from 
Roubini and Sachs (1989). 
 
In some countries, government revenues and expenditures 
are measured for the fiscal year (FY), while GDP is 
measured for the calendar year (CY). Therefore, when revenues 
and expenditures for country i are originally shown 
for the fiscal year they are converted into the calendar year 
as follows: 
 
 (1a) 
 
where 0 < λ < 1. New Zealand’s GDP was also shown for 
the fiscal year and was, therefore, converted to the calendar 
year. Equation 1a is similar to (3.1) in Evans and Karras 
(1991). 
 
 
 
